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ARGUMENT 
I. NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS TIMELY FILED 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(c) governs 
the filing of the notice of appeal in the present case. 
Sub-paragraph (c) provides: 
Filing Prior to Entry of Judgment or Order. 
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, 
a notice of appeal filed after the announcement 
of a decision, judgment, or order, but before the 
entry of the judgment or order of the Trial Court 
shall be treated as filed after such entry and on 
the day thereof. 
In the present case, the Trial Court issued a Minute 
Entry and Order dated May 24, 2000 and the clerk 
purportedly mailed it to the parties on May 26, 2 000. (As 
the Court explained in the Minute Entry, the Rule 59 motion 
had been pending for over 6 months as a result of a 
confusion at the courthouse.) The notice of appeal was 
filed on June 7, 2000. The final judgment was the Amended 
Judgment executed by the Court on June 16, 2 000. The date 
stamp on the document is June 19, 2000. Pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(c), the Notice of 
Appeal is to be treated as though it was filed after the 
Amended Judgment was filed on the same date thereof. 
This situation was most recently addressed in Nielsen 
v. Gurlev, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1994) in which the 
analysis of the Appellate Court concluded that where an 
1 
amended order was merely a clarification of a ruling and 
not an enlargement thereof, a new time for measuring the 
date for appeal was not necessarily created by execution of 
the amended order. Id. at 133. In Nielsen v. Gurlev, the 
memorandum decision was issued December 18, 19 92, the 
notice of appeal was filed December 21, 1992 and judgment 
was entered January 7, 1993. The Court of Appeals treated 
the notice of appeal as filed January 7, 1993. 
This situation is discussed in Nelson v. Stoker, 669 
P.2d 390 (Utah 1983) (prior to adoption of Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure on January 1, 1985) in which the 
Supreme Court quoted various authorities, including the 
Notes of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, which 
stated with respect to Fed. R. App. P.4(a)(2): 
The proposed amendment to Rule 4(a)(2) would 
extend to civil cases the provisions of Rule 
4(b), dealing with criminal cases, designed to 
avoid the loss of the right to appeal by filing 
the notice of appeal prematurely. 
The Supreme Court determined that discretion remained 
with the Appellate Court under the circumstances which also 
involved a "premature" notice of appeal, and found in favor 
of the Appellant because of the absence of prejudice to the 
Appellee and in recognition of the difficulty in knowing 
when a final order will be signed and docketed. id. at 
393. See also C.M.C. Cassitv, Inc. v. Aird, 707 P.2d 1304 
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(Utah 1985) (Also applying rules prior to 1985 adoption of 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure) . 
The time for appeal was 30 days. The causes of action 
being appealed were Defendant's counterclaims for breach of 
contract, wrongful eviction and the punitive damages 
element of the tortious self-help eviction claim. 
Plaintiff's unlawful detainer claim failed at trial because 
of defects in the notice by Plaintiff. Nonetheless, 
whether the deadline of filing an notice of appeal was the 
ten day deadline, because one of the several claims 
originally filed in this case was for unlawful detainer, or 
whether the thirty day deadline applied, because of the 
several other causes of action in the case, is irrelevant. 
The Notice of Appeal was filed after the Trial Court's 
decision on Defendant's Rule 59 Motion but before the 
execution and entry of the final judgment. Pursuant to 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(c), the Notice of 
Appeal is to be treated as though it was filed after the 
entry of the amended judgment on the same day of filing. 
Appellee cites U-M Investments v. Ray, 658 P.2d 1186 
(Utah 1982) in which no notice of appeal was filed after 
the minute entry that disposed of the Rule 59 motion. The 
Supreme Court specifically referenced the absence of an 
appeal after the date of the minute entry. The Supreme 
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Court reasoned that the process of filing a notice of 
appeal after disposition of a post trial motion aids in 
discouraging delay, as may have been involved under the 
circumstances of that case. 
Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah App. 1998), 
also cited by Appellee, involved both an "announcement" of 
decision prior to a notice of appeal being filed as well as 
an appeal which was earlier dismissed by the Court of 
Appeals for being premature. The Court of Appeals was not 
dealing with a written decision on the motion which could 
be subject to appeal or confer jurisdiction on the 
Appellate Court. 
In the present case, notice of appeal was filed after 
the Minute Entry and Order for two reasons. First, the 
Minute Entry and Order were taken by Defendant to be the 
final order of the Court. Second, the Court had directed 
that its Minute Entry was its final order on the last 
sentence the Minute Entry and Order, dated May 24, 2000. 
It was imperative that the time for appeal not be missed in 
the event the Court (which knew it was being appealed and 
may have been the reason for inclusion of the reference to 
the minute entry as the final order) did not quickly notify 
the parties if and when a subsequent order was signed. See 
Minute Entry and Order dated May 24, 2 000 for a history of 
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the protracted six month delay in resolving the Rule 59 
motion, which was the basis of Defendant's concern in this 
regard. In the present case, the decision of the Trial 
Court had been made. There was a written "disposition", as 
required by Rule 4(b). Only a notice of appeal filed 
before a "disposition" of the Rule 59 motion would be 
without effect as provided by Rule (4) (b) . It was the 
execution of the final judgment mirroring the minute entry, 
as addressed by Rule 4(c), which was pending. To find 
otherwise would be to nullify both the express provisions 
and intent of Rule 4(c). Moreover, Defendant had been 
waiting over 6 months, for a ruling on the motion. It 
would be contrary to the interests of justice to deprive 
him of his appeal for any reason when the Minute Entry and 
Order seemed designed to create an uncertainty as to 
whether or not it would affect Defendant's right to appeal 
if Defendant waited to see if the amended judgment would be 
signed and become the final order. 
II, THE APPELLANT IS UNDER NO DUTY TO MARSHAL 
ORAL ARGUMENT FROM PRE-TRIAL MOTION HEARINGS 
It is undisputed that the Trial Court issued various 
orders prior to trial, including without limitation its 
order establishing the requested admissions. The evidence 
submitted is all in written form. As the Appellee explains 
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in the Appellee brief, the Appellee has not chosen to 
appeal the soundness of the Court's decisions with regard 
to the Trial Court's pre-trial orders. The Appellant 
believes that the pre-trial order establishing the 
requested admissions was properly issued. Because the 
Appellant has no desire to overturn any of the orders made 
prior to trial, the Appellant is under no obligation to 
have transcribed any of the oral argument with respect to 
motions which lead to those orders. 
In Appellee's Argument on page 16, the Appellee alleges 
that the Appellant has failed to cite to the evidence 
supporting the Court's ruling. The Appellant refers this 
Court to page 5 of the Brief of the Appellant, where the 
Appellant makes specific reference to the Plaintiff's 
testimony. Cross-examination of the Plaintiff is discussed 
in the statement of facts on pages 5 through 7. Other than 
this testimony by the Plaintiff which is cited by the 
Appellant in the statement of facts, there was no other 
evidence supporting the Trial Court's decision. Therefore, 
the Appellant has marshalled all of the evidence supporting 
the Trial Court's decision. 
More significantly, however, the first question 
presented for appeal is not a question involving the 
testimony of the parties. Instead, the first question of 
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appeal is a question of law. Did the Trial Court have the 
authority under the circumstances of this case to announce 
at the commencement of trial that it would accept evidence 
contradicting the admissions established by the order which 
the Trial Court executed on November 27, 1998? The 
evidence to be marshalled with respect to that question 
only requires the Appellant to identify the existence of 
the order. The order is not a subject of appeal. The 
Appellee has not filed a cross appeal as to that order. 
Therefore, the order establishing the admissions must 
stand. It is the subsequent action of the Court which is 
challenged. The subsequent action of the Court is limited 
to the things which occurred at trial and in response to 
the Defendant's Rule 59 motion. The entire trial has been 
transcribed and the entire relevant record is before this 
Court. 
Ill, THE APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
PRE-TRIAL ORDER ESTABLISHING THE REQUESTED ADMISSIONS IS 
NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, 
Various arguments and references made by the Appellee 
do not apply to any specific legal argument properly before 
this Court. For example, in Appellee's statement appearing 
on pages 1 through 4 of the brief of Appellee, the Appellee 
describes various perceived procedural defects with the 
service of the complaint, processing of a possession bond, 
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service of discovery requests, and the Trial Court's order 
establishing the admissions in question. If the Appellee 
had filed a cross-appeal claiming that the Trial Court 
should not have issued the order establishing the 
admissions as requested, then one might expect the Appellee 
to address some of these facts as background for such a 
cross appeal. Nonetheless, such a cross appeal is not 
properly before this Court. There is no appeal with 
respect to the Trial Court's granting the order 
establishing the admissions as requested, dated November 
27, 1998. Appellee has not marshalled the evidence for or 
against the Court's decision with respect thereto. 
Therefore, it would be inappropriate to attempt to address 
such matter in this Reply Brief. Appellant simply submits 
that the propriety of the Court's order dated November 27, 
1998 has not been challenged on appeal. 
Under heading III of the Brief of the Appellee, the 
Appellee also attempts to argue that the Trial Court erred 
with respect to the Order establishing the admissions as 
requested. As pointed out above, the propriety of that 
order is not before this Court on appeal. If the Appellee 
wished to attack that order, the Appellee should have filed 
a cross-appeal. Moreover, in order to attack that order, 
the Appellee must marshal the evidence necessary for the 
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Court to review the issue of whether or not the Trial Court 
erred in granting the Defendant's motion for an order 
establishing admissions. The argument of the Appellee 
focuses on the question of whether or not he timely 
received the requests for admissions. The presentation of 
this argument is very misleading. It gives the false 
impression that the Trial Court determined that it would 
receive evidence at trial contradicting the admissions on 
the basis that the request for admissions were not timely 
received. However, at trial, whether or not the admissions 
had been timely received was never a question raised by the 
Trial Court. Instead, the Trial Court's indication was 
that it would judge the credibility of the witnesses and/or 
the documents introduced at trial to determine whether or 
not the documents had been altered. Interestingly, the 
Appellee apparently recognizes that the request for 
admissions may have been sent to the Plaintiff, himself, 
who initially represented himself pro se in this case. Not 
only does this reference on page 19 of the Brief of the 
Appellee undermine the argument of the Appellee, but it 
also serves to highlight the numerous questions which 
remain unanswerable as a result of the Appellee's failure 
to marshal the evidence necessary to explain why the Trial 
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Court granted the Defendant's motion which resulted in the 
order establishing admissions, dated November 27, 1998. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE DISCRETION TO OVERTURN 
ITS ORDER ESTABLISHING THE ADMISSIONS AT THE COMMENCEMENT 
OF TRIAL. 
The Appellee continues to attack the Trial Court's 
order establishing admissions on pages 20 through 22 of the 
Brief of the Appellee, The Appellee alleges that 
Plaintiff's objection to Defendant's motion for order 
compelling discovery "could have been treated by the Court 
as a motion to withdraw the request for admissions." Of 
course, all of the arguments raised by the Appellee were 
issues disposed of by the Trial Court prior to its 
execution of the order establishing admissions, dated 
November 27, 1998. At trial, the Court never made any 
reference to any motion by the Defendant for relief from 
the admissions. Likewise the Trial Court's decision with 
respect to Defendant's Rule 59 motion stated that its 
actions had nothing to do with a motion originating with 
the Plaintiff. The minute entry and order, date May 24, 
2000 specifically states "the Court recalls and the view of 
the video confirms that at the outset of trial, the Court 
indicated, admittedly on its own motion (and alerted to the 
possibility by Plaintiff's Trial Brief), that it would 
revisit the request for admissions, particularly the one 
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regarding the purported lease extension, jLf it appeared 
that the extension was the result of fraud or forgery" 
(emphasis added) . The Court stated that it was on its own 
motion that it made the decision to upset its order 
establishing the admissions. There is no rule giving the 
Trial Court authority to upset the established admissions 
on its own motion at the commencement of trial. 
As discussed under argument heading I and II of the 
Brief of the Appellant, by this reference incorporated 
herein, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 36(b) as 
interpreted in Lanaeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc. 952 P.2d 
1058 (Utah 1998), expressly precludes the Trial Court from 
doing so. The Defendant relied upon the Trial Court's own 
ruling based on Lanaeland in preparing for trial. 
The specific witnesses who would have been brought to 
trial to impeach the credibility of the Plaintiff, if the 
Defendant had not relied upon the Trial Court's order 
establishing admissions, would have been the other tenants 
at the premises. These tenants included a gentleman by the 
name of Mr. Chen and a gentleman by the name of Dan 
Rohrberg. If the Court has any question whether Dan 
Rohrberg would have impeached the testimony of the 
Plaintiff, the Court need look no further than the hand 
written affidavit of Mr. Rohrberg signed and notarized on 
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August 3, 1998 and which was incorporated as part of the 
requested admissions as Exhibit "C" [R. 125-126] . It is 
undisputable that Defendant was prejudice by the Trial 
Court's action. 
V, THERE WAS NO FRAUD UPON THE COURT, 
If the Trial Court doubted the authenticity of the 
lease and the lease extension, then it was required to 
address that question at the time of its order establishing 
the admissions in November 1998. 
Throughout the brief of the Appellee, the Appellee 
refers to a "fraud upon the Court." The first reference 
appears on page 3 of the brief of the Appellee in the 
Appellee statement of the case. The Appellee asserts that 
at the outset of trial on March 22, 1999, that the Trial 
Court informed the parties that it was not going to allow a 
fraud upon the Court to be perpetrated. No such words were 
used by the Trial Court. Instead, the Trial Court stated: 
"We do have the issue of the request for 
admissions that have been deemed admitted, and I 
think that is basically the rule and the law of 
the case. However, there are some admissions, as 
I read them, that give me some trouble. I don't 
know how critical, for example, the lease 
extension is to anyone's case. And although that 
appears to have deemed admitted, I think, 
counsel, if there's anything that, I guess in 
this case, that Plaintiff feels that I have 
deemed admitted but that results from fraud or a 
forgery, I think I may take proof on that. 
Because that, to me, would not be something that 
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perhaps should be included. I don't know if it 
was, but I see the allegation that it was. 
So I'm going to give you a little bit of 
leeway there, Mr. Turner, to point out things 
that you think are not--is not correct but that 
are deliberately not correct or result from some 
wrongdoing, because I think there's some area 
there where the Court does need to invoke its 
discretion. Again, there may not be any such 
thing in fact, but if you raise it, if that's the 
purpose, alert the Court to that." (Brief of the 
Appellant, pp 3:17-4:12) 
With regard to both the lease and the lease extension, 
there was conflicting verbal testimony. The Plaintiff 
testified that he signed both documents. The changes to 
the lease are largely irrelevant to the case or the entire 
appeal, however. The case turns upon the lease extension. 
The Plaintiff testified that when he signed the lease 
extension, a majority of the text appearing above his 
signature was not present. In contrast, the Defendant 
testified that the lease extension was in the same form as 
it had been when it was signed by the Plaintiff. Cross-
examination of the Plaintiff revealed glaring 
inconsistencies, approaching impossibility, with respect 
to the Plaintiff's testimony that the lease extension had 
been altered after his execution. That subject matter is 
addressed under Argument III of the Brief of the 
Appellant, by this reference incorporated herein. 
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The lease extension card was a document accepted into 
evidence by the Court. It contained no sign of tampering. 
Putting aside the lack of credibility of Plaintiff's 
testimony, this was simply a matter where two witnesses 
gave conflicting testimony. Would the Appellee 
characterize every instance of conflicting verbal 
testimony by witnesses as an attempt to "perpetrate a 
fraud against the Court"? 
The Trial Court was intelligent. The Trial Court knew 
that if it was going to do something to buttress the 
findings of fact, then it needed to make a statement in 
support of its ruling that it found the Defendant to be 
not credible. The Trial Court, therefore, had motive to 
make the generalized statement that it did concerning the 
Defendant's credibility. Nonetheless, the Trial Court 
never identified any instance of inconsistent testimony by 
the Defendant. The Trial Court never identified any 
"self-serving" statement which impeached the credibility 
of the Defendant. Particularly with respect to the lease 
extension, no testimony was ever offered even by the 
Plaintiff to explain how the lease extension card could 
have been altered after it was signed by the Plaintiff. 
If conflicting testimony is enough to give rise to a 
"fraud upon the Court" allowing the Trial Court to set 
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aside its own Order establishing requested admission, then 
all orders establishing admissions are subject to attack 
by competing testimony at trial. No party will ever be 
able to safely rely on an admission, even with a Trial 
Court Order supporting it and actual documents which 
should speak for themselves. 
In the end, the Trial Court did not find that a fraud 
had been perpetrated against it or the Plaintiff when the 
order establishing the requested admissions was entered. 
Through the entire transcript, the Trial Court's 
statements only reflect a decision to treat Defendant's 
testimony as not being credible. Even before the 
Defendant testified, the Trial Court stated that it 
accepted the Plaintiff's testimony without question as to 
the subject. These statements show that the Trial Court's 
action did not involve a "fraud upon the Court." 
The following is the totality of the evidence which 
the Appellee's brief references in support of its 
contention that the Trial Court's finding that the lease 
had been modified was supported by some evidence. First, 
the Plaintiff verified the lease. Second, the Plaintiff 
testified that he did not have his own copy of the 
document. Third, the Plaintiff identified the items on 
the lease that were in his handwriting as opposed the hand 
15 
writing of the Defendant. Fourth, the Plaintiff testified 
as to items that were not written on the lease at the time 
he signed the lease. Fifth, the Plaintiff introduced 
copies of other leases signed by other tenants. Sixth, 
the Plaintiff testified about the differences between the 
handwritten portions of each of the three leases. 
Finally, another tenant testified that there was no cable 
television at the premises. 
In somewhat of a contrast, the totality of the 
evidence referenced by Appellee with respect to the 
alleged alteration of the lease extension includes the 
following. Plaintiff testified that Mr. Hawkins would 
prepare 3x5 cards for signature by Plaintiff. Plaintiff 
testified that he would sign the 3x5 cards as requested by 
Defendant. Plaintiff testified that he did not speak with 
Defendant about extension of the lease until March, 1998. 
As addressed in the Brief of the Appellant, the Trial 
Court accepted the testimony of the Plaintiff at face 
value, without regard to the inconsistencies of the 
Plaintiff's testimony. As discussed in the Brief of the 
Appellant, the Trial Court was already prepared to make a 
finding based solely on the Plaintiff's testimony before 
Mr. Callahan ever testified. 
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Particularly with regard to the lease extension, it is 
patently unfair for the Trial Court to overturn its Order 
establishing admissions based on nothing more than the 
testimony of the Plaintiff that although he had signed the 
card containing the lease extension, provisions concerning 
the lease extension had been added after he signed. 
Certainly, Plaintiff's testimony did not raise the issue 
to any special level. Plaintiff's testimony was not so 
earth shattering that it would lead one to conclude that 
the lease extension was some effort to perpetrate a fraud 
upon the Court. The testimony was nothing more than the 
simply generic testimony which occurs in any litigation in 
which people have different recollections about events. 
With regard to the lease extension, in particular, and 
as discussed in the Brief of the Appellant, the 
Plaintiff's testimony that the lease extension had been 
altered was not credible. Even if the Trial Court had the 
discretion to alter the admissions at the time of trial, 
or based on testimony at trial, the testimony did not 
justify any amendment to admission no. 18, nor did the 
evidence justify a finding that Exhibit "B" (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit "4") was anything other than an unaltered 
extension of the lease, as it purported to be on its face. 
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Appellee argues that Plaintiff also testified that the 
only time he spoke to Mr. Callahan about extending the 
Lease was in March 1998. The Lease Extension was signed 
January 20, 199 8. Mr. Callahan would have had to have 
created the forgery two months before Plaintiff alleges 
that the subject even came up! [R:301 Plaintiff's Exhibit 
4; 505 p. 37:6-16] The relevant facts are fully discussed 
in the Brief of the Appellant. 
In contrast, the Brief of the Appellee does not cite 
to a single example of where the Trial Court recognized 
any statement by Mr. Callahan was self-serving, 
contradictory or otherwise lead the Court to conclude that 
Mr. Callahan's testimony with regard to the lease 
extension should not be believed. At the end of the case, 
the Trial Court was astute enough to know that it needed 
to make a statement concerning the credibility of the 
Defendant in order to support the judgment that it was 
about to render. However, the transcript of the entire 
trial reveals that the Court had made the determination to 
set aside the critical admission without listening to the 
testimony of Mr. Callahan and, possibly, even without 
regard to the testimony of the Plaintiff. 
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VI, DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AS 
REQUESTED, 
Appellee does not raise any relevant facts or issues 
under their argument concerning attorney's fees. It is 
common sense that if the decision of the Trial Court is 
altered as a result of this appeal, then an award of costs 
and attorney's fees with respect to both the Trial and 
this appeal is appropriate. 
VII, OTHER FACTS AND ISSUES RAISED IN APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
ARE IRRELEVANT OR OTHERWISE WITHOUT MERIT, 
Since they do not apply to any specific legal argument 
being made by Appellee in the brief of the Appellee, 
various issues or statements appear in the Appellee's 
brief are addressed under this final heading. 
For example, the majority of the numbered paragraphs 
in Defendant's statement of facts will not affect the 
outcome of this appeal. Therefore, although the Defendant 
may dispute the Appellee's characterization of the facts, 
no detailed response will be provided. All of the 
relevant facts are addressed with specific references to 
the trial transcript in the Brief of the Appellant. The 
references appearing in the Brief of the Appellee are to 
pages only, and the Appellee has not marshalled all of the 
references to the subject-matter addressed, including 
conflicting evidence. The statement of relevant facts 
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appears to be an effort on the part of the Appellee to re-
try the case or various pretrial motions, rather than 
address the subject matter of the appeal. Various 
statements also represent mischaracterizations of the 
testimony or issues that were not even relevant at trial. 
Reference is made to whether or not Plaintiff's Rule 
59 Motion in the Trial Court was timely filed. For 
example, in the summary of the argument on page 9, the 
Plaintiff alleges that the Rule 59 motion was filed prior 
to the entry of judgment and that it was filed again 13 
days after the judgment was signed. The Plaintiff 
initially raised this argument at the Trial Court level. 
However, the Plaintiff subsequently withdrew this 
objection on November 2, 1999, citing Hudema v. Carpenter, 
989 P. 2d 491 (Utah App. 1999) (the words "not later than" 
provides a deadline but does not prohibit early service), 
which the Plaintiff acknowledged permitted the Trial Court 
to hear the Rule 59 motion filed prior to the Court's 
execution of the judgment. [R: 471-472] (Incidentally, 
the second Rule 59 motion referred to by the Appellee was 
simply a refiling of the same motion at a later date 
following the execution of the judgment. The second 
motion was supported by reference to the earlier filed 
memorandum in support. The Appellee's reference to 
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different Rule 59 motions gives the misleading impression 
that there may have been some difference between the two.) 
In any event, the Trial Court granted the Rule 59 motion 
in part. The amended judgment became the final judgment 
of the Court. The timeliness of the notice of appeal must 
be measured with respect to the amended judgment, as 
addressed in detail above. Notwithstanding the fact that 
it was timely filed, whether or not the Rule 59 motion had 
been timely is not relevant to this appeal. 
Finally, unless the Appellee subsequently corrected 
the error, the Court of Appeal may wish to reject the 
Brief of the Appellee on the basis of the Appellee failure 
to follow the formatting requirements for a brief. 
Specifically, the font size used by the Appellee on the 
copy sent to Appellant is smaller than that allowed by the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 27. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, Defendant Callahan requests that this 
Court reverse the decision of the trial court to accept 
evidence contradicting the admissions pursuant to the 
trial court Order of November 27, 1998, or alternatively 
that this Court find that the evidence presented at trial 
does not support the finding that there was an alteration 
by Defendant of the lease agreement or the lease 
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extension. Defendant Callahan further requests that this 
Court hold on the basis of the lease extension that 
Plaintiff breached the lease agreement between the parties 
and wrongfully evicted Defendant Callahan prior to the 
expiration of the lease extension. Defendant Callahan 
request that this Court direct the trial court to make 
appropriate findings based on the evidence presented at 
trial and include in Defendant's damages award the 
difference in value between the premises he rented from 
Plaintiff and the premises that were subsequently rented, 
general damages including pain and suffering associated 
with the days which Defendant Callahan spent homeless 
following the wrongful eviction, punitive damages, and an 
adjustment to the award of costs and attorney's fees to 
reflect the fact that Defendant Callahan prevailed at 
trial on all issues. Defendant Callahan requests an award 
of costs and fees incurred in connection with this appeal 
and requests leave of Court to present evidence as to the 
appropriate amount. 
DATED this a day of December, 2000. 
Thor B. Roundy O 
Attorney for Appellant 
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